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Criticality and recriticality considerations in heavy liquid metal fast reactors (HLMFRs) after a
hypothetical core meltdown accident are discussed. Although many aspects of system behaviour
in such scenarios can be deduced directly from the classical theory of sodium-cooled fast reactors
(SFRs), certain ideas that have been accepted as true for SFRs cannot be extrapolated to HLM-
FRs without suciently careful thought. In this paper, we are concerned, as in SFRs, with fuel
compaction, but with one important dierence: there would be no boiling of the surrounding heavy
liquid metal pool. Utilizing a Bethe-Tait model, it is shown that, due to the power attening eect
of the heavy liquid metal, explosive excursions at least an order of magnitude higher than for SFRs
in similar situations are conceivable.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Although many aspects of the severe accident perfor-
mance of heavy liquid metal fast reactors (HLMFRs)
can be inferred from past work on the safety analysis of
sodium-cooled fast reactors (SFRs), there are particular
aspects of HLMFR behaviour that cannot be predicted
or extrapolated based on SFR behaviour without su-
ciently careful thought. This paper considers some par-
ticular situations during the so-called disassembly phase
of core disruptive accidents, and specically the com-
paction of fuel in the presence of the surrounding heavy
liquid metal pool after a hypothetical core meltdown ac-
cident, but with one important dierence in comparison
with SFRs: there would be no boiling. The lack of boil-
ing in this scenario has been claimed as a point in favour
of HLM technology; however, as will be demonstrated, it
results in disquieting and serious consequences during a
core meltdown accident. This paper seeks to assess these
consequences.
The present analysis should not be misunderstood as
an attempt to provide a denitive analysis of the scenario
under consideration, or some indication of the probability
of such an accident, but seen as a theoretical examination
of a conceivable event in an HLMFR. In the same way,
the likelihood of a loss of ow or an overpower transient
with a failure of the plant protection system to scram the
reactor are the subject of other studies and lie outside the
scope of the present paper.
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A. A brief review of the theory of nuclear
explosions in SFRs
Early work in SFR safety analysis was motivated by
and based on an assumed core compaction that yielded
a high rate of reactivity gain and led to physical disas-
sembly of the core due to the build-up of internal core
pressures (Waltar and Reynolds, 1981).The calculation of
energy generation during this phase was originally based
on the classic Bethe-Tait analysis (Bethe and Tait, 1956),
and this approach has long prevailed as the basic guide to
containment design for fast breeder reactor (FBR) sys-
tems. Although more sophisticated models have been de-
veloped, the Bethe-Tait approach correctly predicts the
dependence of the disassembly reactivity on the reactor
parameters, and thus will be used in this paper to calcu-
late the eect of the unboiled heavy liquid metal during
the disassembly phase.
Let us consider a loss of ow transient. This design
basis accident (DBA) assumes multiple failures whereby
the reactor coolant recirculation pumps stop accidentally
while the reactor is at full power, without scram, so that
the ssion chain reaction is not stopped. The reduced
coolant ow causes the coolant in the core to heat up
and boil out of the core, thereby allowing the fuel to
heat up (see Fig. 1, steps 2 and 3). The expulsion of the
coolant, or fuel compaction by melting, would then raise
the reactivity and generate an explosive power excursion.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) esti-
mated the explosive yield resulting from this particular
accident to be equivalent to that from 500 kg of TNT
(Webb, 1976).
The explosion mechanism is a sodium coolant vapor
explosion that is assumed to occur when the molten fuel,
which is created by the rst mild power excursion, even-
tually interacts with the (Webb, 1976), and would occur
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FIG. 1: A summary of the sequence of events in the disassembly phase for a SFR accident. Figure courtesy of Dr R.E. Webb
(Webb, 1976). (1). Reactor at start of accident (coolant ow decreases);(2) core overheats; sodium coolant boils out of core;
(3) core melts, slumps, compacts and rising reactivity; (4) mild power and fuel vapor explosion; (5) part of core thrown
upward, leading edge interacts with sodium; (6) sodium vapor occurs, which propels part of the core downward to rejoin
the lower part of the core, causing rapid fuel reassembling; (7) staggered (noncoherent model) fuel reentry, slow gravity fall,
recriticality;(8) coherent mode secondary power excursion, about 5 tons TNT-equiv. nuclear explosion.
as follows: The power excursion of the DBA described
above melts the core and produces a relatively mild fuel
vapor explosion within the core; molten fuel from the
core would then be blown (thrown up) into the coolant
chamber above the core. The leading edge of the molten
fuel entering the coolant chamber could, by mixing with
coolant, generate a sodium vapor explosion. The force
of the explosion (say, about 5 kg TNT-equivalent) could
then drive a mass of fuel back down into the core, rapidly
raising the reactivity by reassembling the fuel, to gener-
ate a disastrous secondary power excursion of about 5
tons TNT-equivalent. Such an explosion would vaporize
the plutonium fuel and eject part of it into the atmo-
sphere (see Fig. 1, steps 6{8).
II. COMPACTION OF MOLTEN FUEL IN THE
PRESENCE OF A HEAVY LIQUID METAL POOL
WITH NO BOILING
As liquid metals, liquid sodium (Na), lead (Pb) and
lead-bismuth (PbBi) are characterized by high thermal
conductivities and low Prandtl numbers (Pr). Addition-
ally, the high surface tension for Pb and PbBi leads to a
situation in which most of the coolant in the core is super-
heated before boiling is initiated. Hence, once a bubble
does form, most of the superheated heavy liquid metal
may be instantaneously transformed into vapor. In sum-
mary, we can say that it is highly unlikely that a sucient
level of superheating could be reached to initiate boiling
with the immersion of molten fuel into a Pb or PbBi liq-
uid pool while the bulk heavy liquid metal temperature
is still substantially subcooled. The latent heat of evap-
oration for Pb and PbBi is large and the liquid would
have to be superheated by  500C before all the liquid
could instantaneously vaporize. A substantial amount of
energy is required to boil the heavy liquid metal in the
pool (for a small-to-medium pool reactor this could be in
the order of 1 GJ). So much energy would be not avail-
able in the early stages of the disassembly phase of an
accident.
In this scenario, considering the sudden contact be-
tween the hot molten fuel and the cold heavy liquid metal
coolant, the contact temperature Ti will be established
instantaneously according to
Ti   Tc
Th   Ti =

KhmhCh
KcmcCc
1=2
(1)
where K is the thermal conductivity, m the density, and
C the specic heat capacity, and subscripts h and c refer
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FIG. 2: Available superheat T after sudden contact between
molten fuel at a temperature Th = 2950 K and liquid metal
coolants, as a function of coolant temperature, for Na, Pb and
PbBi.
to the hot and cold liquids, respectively.
Fig. 2 shows the available superheat from instanta-
neous contact according to Eq. (1) for dierent surround-
ing liquids (Na, Pb and PbBi), assuming: Th = 2950 K,
the melting temperature of MOX (0.7U-0.3Pu)O2 fuel
[1]; mh  10000 kgm 3; Kh = 3 W/mK: Ch =
450 J/kgK. It is clear that for the case of a heavy liq-
uid metal (Pb or PbBi), the fuel temperature would not
be suciently beyond the saturation temperature Tsat
to initiate bubble nucleation for pool boiling. Finally, it
should also be noted that radiative heat transfer could
be strongly reduced in the case of Pb because of its low
coecient of emissivity " (see Appendix A).
III. THE BETHE-TAIT MODEL
The analytical method of calculating the energy re-
lease in a large nuclear burst in fast reactors given by
Bethe-Tait (Bethe and Tait, 1956) assumes an expo-
nential rise in the power. From this expression for the
generated energy, an equation of state is used to cal-
culate pressures, neglecting local expansion. Then, us-
ing the pressures obtained and neglecting propagation,
displacements and reactivity reductions are calculated.
The Bethe-Tait method, although based on some simpli-
fying assumptions, correctly predicts the dependence of
the disassembly reactivity on the other reactor parame-
ters.
The following expression for the disassembly reactivity
is deduced (Lewis 1977) within the framework of Bethe-
Tait model:
d2d
dt2
=  
M2
m1h 20i
hpr2[ 0r2 0   (r 0)2]i (2)
where d is the disassembly reactivity, M is the average
migration length, m the average core density, 1 the
innite multiplication factor, p the pressure, and  0 is
the spatial distribution of the power.
Assuming that the reactor is a bare, uniform sphere of
radius R. The spatial distribution of the power is then
given by:
 0(r) =
R
r
sin
r
R

(3)
where r is the radial distance. For this ux distribution
it may be shown that
r2[ 0r2 0   (r 0)2] = 4
3
4
R4
+O(r2) (4)
Since it is expected that the pressure build-up will be
concentrated near the center of the core, where r is small,
Eq. (3) can be approximated using a Taylor series:
 0  1  
2r2
6 R2
+ ::: (5)
whence Eq. (2) becomes:
d2d
dt2
=  8
9
6 M2
m1 R4
1
V
hpi (6)
where V is the volume of reactor, which for this model is
equal to 43
R3.
In Eq. (6), we now need an equation of state that al-
lows the pressure to be connected with the energy density.
Assuming a classical approach in which the pressure in-
creases linearly with energy density above some threshold
in energy density e, we have:
e < e : p = 0;
e  e : p = (   1) m(e  e); (7)
where  is the ratio of specic heats, and e is the energy
generated per unit mass of the core.
Assume that e(r; t) is separable in space and time:
e(r; t) = T (t)N(r) (8)
with the normalization condition:
hN(r)mi = 1 (9)
Combining Eqs. (7), (8) and (9), and inserting into
Eq. (6), while also using both the relation between power
P and reactivity :
dP (t)
dt
=
_t

P (t) (10)
4where  is the prompt neutron generation time, and the
constant density approximation to the momentum equa-
tion:
@v
@t
=   1
m
rp; (11)
where v is the velocity, we obtain, after a series of cal-
culations, the total energy release E into the Bethe-Tait
model, as (Lewis 1977):
E  9
8
1 m
6 M2(   1)
 
ln
(
_


E
P (0)
2)!3=2
R4V
_3=2
1=2
(12)
where E is the energy at the initiation of disassembly,
and P0 is the power level at the moment the reactor is
brought prompt critical (at t = 0).
Now, in the particular application under consideration,
the heavy liquid metal surrounding the core acts as a
reector. Thus, using the subscripts c and r to denote
core and reector respectively, the following dierential
equations governing the neutron ux distribution can be
dened:
Dcr2 c   c c + c c = 0 (13)
Drr2 r   r r = 0 (14)
where D is the diusion coecient,  is the macroscopic
absorption cross-section, and no source term appears in
Eq. (14) (the reector equation) since the liquid metal
coolant is presumed not to be ssionable.
The solution of Eq. (13) (the equation for the core) is:
 c(r) =
A sinBcr
r
(15)
and the solution of Eq. (14) with the assumption that
Rc !1:
 r(r) =
A0e r=Lr
r
(16)
where
L2r =
Dr
r
(17)
Recognising that the neutron ux  and current J
must be continuous across the interface between core and
reector and therefore:
 c( R) =  r( R) (18)
Jc( R) = Jr( R) (19)
then establishes the following system of equations:
A sinBc R
R
=
A0e  R=Lr
R
(20)
 DcA

Bc cosBc R
R
  sinBc
R
R2

= DrA
0e  R=Lr

1
Lr R
+
1
R2

(21)
Combining these equations and simplifying:
Bc R cotBc R = 1  Dr
Dc

1 +
R
Lr

(22)
assuming Dr  Dc, which is not a strong approximation
for Pb and PbBi:
cotBc R =   1
BcLr
(23)
resulting in two special cases, namely:
 assuming high absorption in the reector, and
 assuming negligible absorption in the reector.
For the rst case, the core buckling is then
Bc =

R
(24)
which is, of course, the same expression as for a voided
core. For the case of negligible absorption in the reector,
we have:
Bc =

2 R
(25)
For the sake of simplicity, a generalized expression may
be used to take into account the eect of the reector on
the core buckling:
Bc =

f R
(26)
where f is the power attening factor, the value of which
lies between f = 1 for a reector with high absorption or
a voided core, and f = 2 for a reector with low neutronic
absorption.
Thus, proceeding in the same way in calculating the
yield of available energy but considering, instead of
Eq. (3) for the spatial distribution of the power, the cal-
culated eect of the power attening of reector:
 0 =
f R
r
sin

r
f R

(27)
the nal available energy E can be expressed as:
E
E0
=

f 6   f
7
2
sin
2
f

(28)
where E0 is the available energy in the absence of a re-
ector, which is given by Eq. (12).
In the limit as f ! 2, Eq. (28) gives the upper bound
on E as:
E
E0
 f 6 (29)
5To obtain an estimate of the parameter f for a lead-
cooled reactor, we can consider the core buckling
B2c =
1   1
L2c
(30)
where 1 is the innite multiplication factor, and
L2c =
Dc
c
(31)
Then, inserting Eqs. (31), (30) and (17) into Eq. (23)
yields:
cotBc R =   1p
1   1
r
c
(32)
Assuming 1  1:8, and r=c  0:01, we obtain that
f  1:98.
If it is acceptable to ignore the mild eects of the loga-
rithmic term in Eq. (12), an \eective" rate of reactivity
insertion may be dened as
_e = _  f 4 (33)
Although Eq. (29) suggests the reector has a strong
eect on the energy release, a weaker dependence could
be anticipated considering the approximations used. For
example, in Eq. (5) using a Taylor series expansion, we
are neglecting the dependence of d on the power distri-
bution in the core. According to Jankus (Jankus. 1962)
a parabolic distribution results in a weaker dependence
on the power attening factor for large excursions of the
form:
E   E
E
 ! q
 3=2
1  0:6q 
1  6q5 + 3q
2
7
q1=2
(34)
where q = 
2
6f 2
. Fig. 3 shows the ratio of excess energy
to threshold energy, E EE , as a function of the power
attening factor f according to Eq. (34). This shows that
the presence of a reector could enhance the explosion
yield by up to an order of magnitude.
IV. DOPPLER EFFECT
Thus far, we have deduced the strong eect of the
presence of the surrounding unboiled heavy liquid metal
on the magnitude of disassembly reactivity, and then on
the increase in the explosive yield of a power excursion.
These calculations show that an increase in explosive
yield of up to an order of magnitude is theoretically con-
ceivable. However, no Doppler feedback was considered
in these calculations. Doppler feedback could be, as is
well known, an important mitigating mechanism.
For scoping calculations of this sort, it would be use-
ful to be able to deduce the value of Doppler coecient
that will cause the explosive release to become, say, an
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FIG. 3: The ratio of excess energy to threshold energy, E E
E ,
as a function of the power attening factor f in the simple
Bethe-Tait calculation according to Jankus (Jankus. 1962).
order of magnitude smaller, mitigating the eect of the
surrounding heavy liquid metal. Smith et al. (Smith, et
al. 1965) estimated the critical value of the Doppler coef-
cient that will cause the explosive release to become one
order of magnitude less than that which would occur in
the absence of prompt reactivity feedback. An estimate
of the Doppler coecient needed to meet this criterion is
(Smith, et al. 1965):
KD =  
h
2 _ ln(e _
p
(2=P0))
i1=2
ln [1 + 0:73(e=cvT0))
(35)
where P0 is the reactor power at delayed critical, T0 is the
initial average fuel temperature,  is the delayed neutron
fraction, and cv is the specic heat capacity at constant
volume.
Thus, for a small (say 100 MWth) fast reactor with the
following typical parameter values:  = 2; e = 106 J/kg;
T0 = 1800 K; cv = 300 J/kgK;  = 5  10 7 s;  =
0:3%; P0 = 2:510 2 MW/kg; we obtain the relationship
shown in Fig. 4. For an initial rate of change of reactivity
of _ = 100 $=s, a Doppler coecient of  370 pcm will
reduce the explosive yield by one order of magnitude.
In applying the above results, ANL calculated a nu-
clear explosion of about 655 kg TNT-equivalent for the
accident in the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) reactor
with a reactivity insertion of 100 $=s [24]. For the same
reactivity insertion of 100 $=s applied to a small (100
MWth) fast reactor the 655 kg TNT-equivalent gure
would scale down to a 60 kg TNT-equivalent explosion
considering the 70 fuel assemblies and neglecting the
eect of the surrounding heavy liquid metal. Account-
ing for the presence of the unboiled heavy liquid metal
pool according to Eq. (29) and taking f  2 predicts a
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FIG. 4: Doppler coecient needed to reduce the energy re-
lease by one order of magnitude as a function of initial reac-
tivity insertion rate.
3.8 ton TNT-equivalent explosion, or something like 6.4
World War II `blockbuster' bombs, exceeding the maxi-
mum economically viable explosion containment capabil-
ity.
V. THE PERFORMANCE OF THE VESSEL
A TNT explosion is a detonation lasting only microsec-
onds, creating local pressures of the order of 50,000 atmo-
spheres. However, the hypothesized energy release from
a nuclear excursion resembles that from propellant-type
conagrations, creating pressures of only a few hundred
atmospheres but lasting over a timescale of milliseconds.
The forms of the energy release and of the resulting struc-
tural damage dier signicantly between a high explosive
detonation and a propellant conagration.
Considering the yield of TNT Containment Law for
ideal vessels (nozzles, weldments, or rigid end con-
straints) given by (Wise and Proctor 1965):
W =

1:407t(3:41 + 0:117Ri=h0)(R
2
e  R2i )1:85
105m 0:85(1:47 + 0:0373R1=h0)0:15R0:15i
0:811
(36)
whereW is the charge weight (of TNT or pentolite) in lb,
m is the density of the vessel material in lb/ft3, Ri is the
initial internal radius of the vessel in ft, Re is the initial
external radius of the vessel in ft, h0 is the initial wall
thickness of the vessel in ft,  is the maximum permissible
strain of the vessel material, and t is the true stress in
psi, given by:
t = y +

u(1 + u)  y
u

 (37)
where y is the yield stress of the vessel material in psi,
u is the ultimate stress of the vessel material in psi, and
u is the ultimate strain of the vessel material.
For vessels tted with nozzles, weldments, and rigid
end closures, it was postulated that real vessels can be
expected to withstand safely strains as large as 13u. Im-
posing this restriction on Eq. (36) yields:
W =

0:1563m0:85uu(3:41 + 0:117Ri=h0)(R
2
e  R2i )1:85
105(2y + u + uu) 1(1:47 + 0:0373Ri=h0)0:15R0:15i
0:811
Applying this equation, with the following parameters
for the vessel of a typical small (100 MWth) reactor: m =
8000 kg/m
3
, Ri = 4 m, Re = 4:08 m, h0 = 8 cm, u =
0:5, t = 472:33 MPa, y = 290 MPa, u = 588 MPa,
we obtain an upper bound for the maximum containment
capability of about 422 kg TNT-equivalent.
Taking into account our previous calculations, for a full
gravitational compaction of the 100 MWth core, the ves-
sel could withstand the 60 kg TNT-equivalent explosion
from a 100 $/s reactivity insertion if a bare core is as-
sumed; however, allowing for the presence of the unboiled
heavy liquid metal coolant, the explosive yield would
be on the order of 3.8 ton TNT-equivalent according to
Eq. (29) with f = 2 or about 600 kg TNT-equivalent with
the weaker dependence from Jankus (Jankus. 1962), see
Eq. (34).
VI. SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND
CONCLUSIONS
A methodology for providing an estimate of the order
of magnitude of the explosion during a core meltdown-
compaction accident for heavy liquid metal fast reactors
has been presented. Utilizing the Bethe-Tait model, it is
shown that a much more powerful explosion is conceiv-
able owing to the possibility of the presence of unboiled
heavy liquid metal during the compaction. Taking into
account the reduction due to the Doppler eect, the ex-
plosive yield could be at least one order of magnitude
higher for lead or lead-bismuth cooled fast reactors than
for sodium fast reactors. In light of this disquieting re-
sult, additional research and development is required to
investigate further this accident scenario.
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FIG. 5: Core disassembly model for a hard system
APPENDIX A: EMISSIVITY IN A LEAD-SHELL
BUBBLE
Let us assume that the spherical volume of mixed gases
(lead and fuel) is surrounding by liquid lead media, rep-
resenting two parallel layers whose facing surfaces have
emissivities "f and "Pb.
A certain fraction of the radiation of a specic wave-
length leaves the rst internal layer (with emissivity "f )
and enters the second external layer (with emissivity
"Pb). A fraction of this incident radiation does not pass
through the surface to the other side and is reected.
The fraction of the radiation that is reected back to
the rst layer will be "f (1  "Pb). Then, a fraction equal
to "f (1 "Pb)(1 "f ) will be reected back to the second
layer again. Due to this process of back and forth reec-
tion, a steady state results giving the total proportion of
radiation entering the second layer (from the rst layer)
to be:
"f;Pb =
"f"Pb
"f + "Pb(1  "f ) (A1)
If the rst layer has an ideal emissivity, i.e. "f = 1,
and the second layer has an emissivity "Pb  "f then
"f;Pb  "Pb.
Wien's Law for a gas at a temperature T of 3500 K
gives a maximum radiation wavelength on the order of
µm at which the emissivity of lead is 0.05.
APPENDIX B: EQUATION OF STATE
In order to contemplate the possibility of a single-phase
or "hard-system", we can deduce a rudimentary expres-
sion to predict the suitability of this pressure.
Let us consider that after a certain expansion, the va-
por fuel hit the surrounding liquid lead and stop instan-
taneously in a very short time which is compared with
the propagation time for a pressure wave to travel the
length of the core. (See Fig. 9)
The pressure pulse produced by the instantaneously des-
acceleration of the expanded vapor fuel can be calculated
from the Joukowsky equation,
p
t
= mc
v
t
(B1)
where, here, m is the average fuel density, c is the speed
of sound in the uid, and v is the velocity of expanded
fuel, and t the time interval. Considering the assumption
of suddenly des-acceleration the above expression may be
rewritten as
p = mcv (B2)
However, the speed of sound, c, is dependent upon the
physical properties of the liquid, and the presence of
bubbles markedly decreases the eective speed of sound
in the liquid. Although the rigorous treatment of the
acoustic characteristics of bubbles requires a great deal
of rather advanced mathematics, (Epstein 1941), (Foldy.
1944). However, a simple approximation can be made
when the radius R of the bubbles is very small compared
with the wavelength of sound in the liquid, or (Research
Analysis Group, 1969.)
 =
2R

 1 (B3)
where  is the ratio of the bubble circumference to the
wavelength . This lead to the equation
c20
c2
= 1 +
3
2r
(B4)
where c0 is the speed of sound when no bubbles are
present, and r is is the ratio of the bubble circumfer-
ence 2R to the wavelength  at resonance, dened as
r =
1
c
r
3p0
m
(B5)
being p0 the pressure surrounding the bubbles. and 
is the total volume of of gas present as bubbles in 1cm3
of the liquid-bubble mixture. Thus  is dened by the
equation
 =
Z
4
3
R3n(R)dR (B6)
where n(R) s the bubble distribution. Assuming a ho-
mogeneous mixture of bubbles, then,  may be written
as function of distribute void fraction (percent) as
 =

100
(B7)
8The speed of sound in a liquid is given by
c0 =
r
(K + b  p)
m
(B8)
where K is the bulk modulus of the uid, and b is a con-
stant that takes account the pressure-dependence with a
value between 2-5.
Taking into account that the velocity of expanded gas
can be put as function of kinetic energy per unit of mass
according with
v =
p
2e (B9)
where e is the energy per unit of mass. Upon substi-
tuting equations (B9),(B8) and (B4) into Eq. (B2), one
obtain for the equation of state.
Final Final
Pressure Temperature
Total at Core at
energy Center Core Center
Voids (MW-sec) (atm) (oK)
Distributed
Voids
(%)
0 563 3.8 4104
0.2 704 6.4 4255
0.5 905 12.3 4471
1.0 1220 29.9 4810
2.4 1810 111 5437
5.0 2560 373 6233
40.0 2620 399 6287
Only central 3160 739 6834
zone voided
Central zone
voided and 1% 1860 123 5495
void in blanket
TABLE I: Dependence upon initial voids with insertion Rate
of 100$=sec, [13] .
p = 2 m(e  e)

K
p
+ b

1
1 + 31002r
(B10)
Although with some excessive simplication, suce
it to point out the dramatic dependence with the dis-
tributed void because the strongly eect on the speed of
sound. The above result seems in agreement with the
calculations from (Nicholson and Jackson) in their com-
puter calculations using a two-dimensional neutronic-
hydrodynamics disassembly program (see Table I).
In Fig.5, to obtain some idea of the pressure predicted
by Eq. (B10), we assume some typical values of the pa-
rameters for sodium: b = 3,  = 1:98, sound speed of
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d 
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Table. I, Ref [23]
Eq.(B10)
Distributed voids, (%)
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FIG. 6: Dependence total energy upon initial voids with in-
sertion Rate of 100$=sec for FFTF according with (Nicholson
and Jackson)and Eq. (B10)
1800m/s, p = 1 atm, r = 4  10 2 in comparison with
the calculations from (Nicholson and Jackson) and Eq.
B10, where seems that from a threshold of bubble con-
centration the system behaves as a two-phase or "soft
system"
NOMENCLATURE
A = constant of integration
b = constant
Bc = core buckling
D = diusion coecient
c = speed of sound
e = energy per unit mass
f = power attening factor, Eq. (26)
g = acceleration due to gravity
J = neutron current
K = bulk modulus of the uid
k = thermal conductivity
t = time
h0 = initial wall thickness of vessel
Lc = cover gas length
L = neutron path length
M = migration length
Mf = mass of fuel
MPbBi = Mass of fuel PbBi column above diaphragms
of MYRRHA
n = bubble distribution
9N = time dependence of power ux
m = density
p = pressure
P = power
r = radial distance
Ri = initial internal radius of vessel
Re = initial external radius of vessel
Rg = ideal gas constant
R = radius of equivalent core
v = velocity
t = time
W = charge weight
z = depth penetration of the molten fuel into the heavy
liquid metal pool
Greek symbols
 = void fraction (%)
 = reactivity
 = multiplication factor
 = maximum permissible strain of vessel material
u = ultimate strain of vessel material
" = emissivity
 = spatial distribution of the power
 = prompt neutron generation time
 = ratio specic heats
 = macroscopic cross-section
t = true stress of vessel material
y = yield stress of vessel material
u = ultimate stress of vessel material
 = ratio of the bubble circumference to the wavelength
 = total volume of gas present as bubbles in 1 cm3 of
the liquid-bubble mixture
Subscripts
1 = innite multiplication factor
c = core
d = disassembly
r = reector
h = hot
c = cold
f = fuel
l = liquid
Pb = lead
PbBi = lead-bismuth eutectic
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